Published:
2010-12-01
Las teorías de la Regulación y Privatización de los Servicios Públicos Public service regulation and privatisation theories
Main Article Content
How to Cite
Paez Perez, P. N., & Silva Ruiz, J. (2010). Public service regulation and privatisation theories. Administración & Desarrollo, 38(52), 39-56. https://doi.org/10.22431/25005227.154
Este artículo examina el problema de la privatización de los servicios públicos domiciliarios desde las teorías del interés público y las teorías del interés privado. Cuando se aborda el análisis del problema, prevalece la concepción de racionalidad privada, perspectiva desde la cual se reduce a comparar la eficiencia pública contra la privada. La primera supone un crecimiento desmedido de la burocracia y problemas asociados con la falta de incentivos para los administradores públicos, argumentos que justifican en alguna medida la privatización. Al mismo tiempo se observa una relación crítica entre el sector público, el sector privado y algunos grupos políticos, por el juego de intereses que se crean en estas relaciones. Los procesos de privatización dejan entrever unas discusiones bastante interesantes tanto desde el punto de vista teórico como práctico. La teoría presupone que los procesos de privatización hacen más eficiente (y más competitivo) la prestación de los servicios públicos y habría asimismo una ganancia en la asignación global de los recursos. En la práctica, el papel de los grupos de presión es decisivo en sus resultados y no en todos las casos significa una ganancia en eficiencia ni en productividad
Keywords:
Privatización, sector público, sector privado, eficiencia, grupos de interés, elección pública, regulación.
This article uses public and private interest theories for examining the issue of public service privatisation. The concept of private rationality was seen to prevail when addressing and analysing this topic; such perspective reduces an approach to simply comparing public and private efficiency. The former supposes an excessive growth of bureaucracy and problems associated with a lack of incentives for public administrators, such arguments thereby justifying privatisation to some extent. A critical relationship can also be observed between the public and private sectors and some political groups due to the play of interests created in such relationships. Privatisation seems to hint at interesting theoretical and practical discussion. Theory assumes that privatisation makes public service provision become more efficient (and competitive), thereby benefiting communities/populations regarding the overall allocation of resources. Pressure groups¿ roles are decisive regarding results in practice and this does not necessarily mean a gain in efficiency or productivity in all cases.
Keywords:
Privasitation, public sector, private sector, efficiency, interest group, public choice, regulation
References
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Boycko, M., Shleifer A., R. Vishny. 1996. “A Theory of Privatization”. Economic Journal, No. 106: 309-19.
Brada, J. C. 1996. “Privatization is Transition... Or Is It?”. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, No. 2:(67- 86).
Coase, R. H. 1994. La empresa, el mercado y la ley. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
Coase, R. H. 1937. “The nature of the firm”. Económica, No. 4 (1937):386- 405.
Coase, R. H. 1960. “The problem of social cost”. Journal of Law and Economics 140, No. 1:1-44.
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Hiriart, Y., Martimort, D. y Jerome, P. 2004. On the optimal use of ex-ante regulation and ex post liability. University of Toulouse (IDEI, LEERNA).
Jordan, W. 1972. “Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation”. Journal of Law and Economics (1972): 151-76.
Joskow, P. L. 1974. “Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation”. Journal of Law and Economics 17, no. 2: 291-37.
Kikeri, S. 2004.”An Assesment on Privatization”. Edited by John Nellis. Washington: World Bank.
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Laffont, J. y Tirole J. J. 1994. Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation Cambridge: MIT Press.
Litvack, J. y Roden A. 2003. Gunnar S. Eskeland; Jennie. Fiscal Descentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraint. Boston: MIT Press.
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Montes, J. 2004. “Hasta dónde puede llegar la privatización”. Teoría y polí- tica de privatizaciones, su contribución a la modernización económica: Análisis del caso español. Madrid: Fundación SEPI.
Muller, D. 2003. Public Choice III. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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Pulido, A. 2004. “Innovación, competitividad y privatización”. Teoría y polí- tica de privatizaciones. Su contribución a la modernización económica: El caso español. Madrid: Fundación SEPI.
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Sagansky, M. y Porter J. 1976. “Information, politics and economic analysis: The regulatory decision process in the air freight cases”. Public Policy 24, No. 2:263-307.
Samuelson, P. 1954. “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure”. Review of Economics and Statistics 36, No. 4:387-89.
Shapiro, C. y Willig, R. 1990. “Economic Rationales for the Scope of Privatization”. The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization. J. Waterbury e N. Suleiman (Edited). London: Westview Press.
Shleifer, A. y R. Vishny. 1994. “Politicians and the Firms”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, No. 109: 995-1025.
Solanes, M. 2000. “Servicios públicos y regulación. Consecuencias legales de las fallas del mercado”. Santiago de Chile: CEPAL-ECLAC.
Stern, J. 2003. “Regulation and contracts for utility services: Substitutes or complements? Lessons from UK Railway and Electricity History”. Journal of Policy Reform, 2003, 6 (4):193-21.
Spiller, P. y Abdala, M. 2000. Institutions, Contracts and Regulation in Argentina. Temas, Buenos Aires.
Stigler, G. 1971. “The Theory of Economic Regulation”. Bell Journal of Economics 2, No. 1:3-21.
Stubblebine, C. 1983. Reaganomics: A Midterm Report. Ics Pr.
Vickers, J. y Yarrow G. 1998. “Privatization: An Economic Analysis” MIT Series on the Regulation of Economic Activity. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Weingast, B. 1997. “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law.” American Political Science Review 91: 245-63.
Williamson, O. 2000. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: The Free Press, 1985.
1985. “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead”. Journal of Economic Literature, No. 38:595-613.
Yarrow, G. y Vickers John. 2002. Privatization: An Economic Analysis. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997.
Zafirovski, Milan. “Administration and Society: Beyond Public Choice?”. Public Administration 79, No. 3:665-88.
Becker, G. 1983. “A Theory of Competition among Pressure Groups for Political Influence”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 98: 371-400.
Baumol, W. 1980. Public and Private Enterprise in a Mixed Economy. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.
Benavides, J. y Chong A. 2007. “Privatización y Regulación en América Latina”. El Estado de las Reformas del Estado en América Latina. Ed. Eduardo Lora. Madrid: Mayol Ediciones.
Boycko, M., Shleifer A., R. Vishny. 1996. “A Theory of Privatization”. Economic Journal, No. 106: 309-19.
Brada, J. C. 1996. “Privatization is Transition... Or Is It?”. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 10, No. 2:(67- 86).
Coase, R. H. 1994. La empresa, el mercado y la ley. Madrid: Alianza Editorial.
Coase, R. H. 1937. “The nature of the firm”. Económica, No. 4 (1937):386- 405.
Coase, R. H. 1960. “The problem of social cost”. Journal of Law and Economics 140, No. 1:1-44.
“Nueve electrificadoras al borde de la quiebra”. http://www.eltiempo.com/ archivo/documento/MAM-250810.
Gamir, L. 2004. Política de privatizaciones y su marco de política económica. Coherencia, credibilidad y análisis coste-beneficio. Teoría y política de privatizaciones: Su contribución a la modernización económica. Análisis del caso español. Madrid: Fundación SEPI.
Goldberg, V. 1974. “Institutional Change and the Quasi-Invisible Hand”. University of California, 1974.
Hernández, DeCos P. y Argimón, J., González-Páramo J. 2000. Does Public Ownership Affects Business Performance? Empirical Evidence with panel data from the spanish manufacturing sector”. Madrid: Servicio de Estudios del Banco de España.
Hiriart, Y., Martimort, D. y Jerome, P. 2004. On the optimal use of ex-ante regulation and ex post liability. University of Toulouse (IDEI, LEERNA).
Jordan, W. 1972. “Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Government Regulation”. Journal of Law and Economics (1972): 151-76.
Joskow, P. L. 1974. “Inflation and Environmental Concern: Structural Change in the Process of Public Utility Price Regulation”. Journal of Law and Economics 17, no. 2: 291-37.
Kikeri, S. 2004.”An Assesment on Privatization”. Edited by John Nellis. Washington: World Bank.
Laffont, J. J. 1993. “Regulation of Pollution with Assymetric Information”. Toulouse: GREMAQ.
Laffont, J. y Tirole J. J. 1994. Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation Cambridge: MIT Press.
Litvack, J. y Roden A. 2003. Gunnar S. Eskeland; Jennie. Fiscal Descentralization and the Challenge of Hard Budget Constraint. Boston: MIT Press.
Marshall, A. 1997. Principles of Economics. Amherst, Prometheus Books.
Mitnick, B. 1974. “The theory of agency: The concept of fiduciary rationality and some consecuences”. University of Pensilvania.
Montes, J. 2004. “Hasta dónde puede llegar la privatización”. Teoría y polí- tica de privatizaciones, su contribución a la modernización económica: Análisis del caso español. Madrid: Fundación SEPI.
Muller, D. 2003. Public Choice III. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Musgrave, R. 1959. The Theory of Public Finance: A Study of Public Economy. New York: McGraw-Hill.
North, D. 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History. New York: Norton.
Peltzman, S. 1976. “Toward a more general theory of regulation”. Journal of Law and Economics, No. 19:211-40.
Pigou, A. 2010. The Economics of Welfare. Memphis, General Books. Posner, R. 1974. “Theories of Economic Regulation”. Bell Journal of Economics 5, No. 2:225-358.
Pulido, A. 2004. “Innovación, competitividad y privatización”. Teoría y polí- tica de privatizaciones. Su contribución a la modernización económica: El caso español. Madrid: Fundación SEPI.
Rosa, J. y Edouard P. 2010. “When to Privatize? When to Nationalize? A Competition for Ownership Approach”. Kyklos 63, No. 1:110-32.
Sagansky, M. y Porter J. 1976. “Information, politics and economic analysis: The regulatory decision process in the air freight cases”. Public Policy 24, No. 2:263-307.
Samuelson, P. 1954. “The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure”. Review of Economics and Statistics 36, No. 4:387-89.
Shapiro, C. y Willig, R. 1990. “Economic Rationales for the Scope of Privatization”. The Political Economy of Public Sector Reform and Privatization. J. Waterbury e N. Suleiman (Edited). London: Westview Press.
Shleifer, A. y R. Vishny. 1994. “Politicians and the Firms”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, No. 109: 995-1025.
Solanes, M. 2000. “Servicios públicos y regulación. Consecuencias legales de las fallas del mercado”. Santiago de Chile: CEPAL-ECLAC.
Stern, J. 2003. “Regulation and contracts for utility services: Substitutes or complements? Lessons from UK Railway and Electricity History”. Journal of Policy Reform, 2003, 6 (4):193-21.
Spiller, P. y Abdala, M. 2000. Institutions, Contracts and Regulation in Argentina. Temas, Buenos Aires.
Stigler, G. 1971. “The Theory of Economic Regulation”. Bell Journal of Economics 2, No. 1:3-21.
Stubblebine, C. 1983. Reaganomics: A Midterm Report. Ics Pr.
Vickers, J. y Yarrow G. 1998. “Privatization: An Economic Analysis” MIT Series on the Regulation of Economic Activity. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Weingast, B. 1997. “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law.” American Political Science Review 91: 245-63.
Williamson, O. 2000. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: The Free Press, 1985.
1985. “The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead”. Journal of Economic Literature, No. 38:595-613.
Yarrow, G. y Vickers John. 2002. Privatization: An Economic Analysis. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997.
Zafirovski, Milan. “Administration and Society: Beyond Public Choice?”. Public Administration 79, No. 3:665-88.
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